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The Smartness Mandate:
Notes toward a Critique
ORIT HALPERN, ROBERT MITCHELL, 
AND BERNARD DIONYSIUS GEOGHEGAN
On November 6, 2008, still in the immediate aftermath of the
worldwide economic crisis initiated by the U.S. subprime
mortgage market collapse, then chair of IBM Sam Palmisano
delivered a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in New
York City. The council is one of the foremost think tanks in the
United States, its membership comprising senior figures in
government, the intelligence community (including the Central
Intelligence Agency), business leaders, financiers, lawyers, and
the media. Yet Palmisano was not there to discuss the fate of
the global economy. Rather, he introduced his corporation’s
vision of the future in a talk titled “A Smarter Planet.” In glow-
ing terms, Palmisano laid out a vision of fiber optic cables,
high-bandwidth infrastructure, seamless supply chain and
logistical capacity, a clean environment, and eternal economic
growth, all of which were to be the preconditions for a “smart”
planet. IBM, he argued, would lead the globe to the next fron-
tier, a network beyond social networks and mere Twitter chats.
This future world would come into being through the integra-
tion of human beings and machines into a seamless “Internet
of things” that would generate the data necessary for organiz-
ing production and labor, enhancing marketing, facilitating
democracy and prosperity, and—perhaps most important—for
enabling a mode of automated, and seemingly apolitical, deci-
sion-making that would guarantee the survival of the human
species in the face of pressing environmental challenges. In
Palmisano’s talk, “smartness” named the interweaving of
dynamic, emergent computational networks with the goal of pro-
ducing a more resilient human species; that is, a species able to
absorb and survive environmental, economic, and security crises
by means of perpetually optimizing and adapting technologies.1 
Palmisano’s speech was notable less for its content, which to
a degree was an amalgamation of existing claims about increased
bandwidth, complexity, and ecological salvation, than for the
way in which its economic context and its planetary terminol-
ogy made explicit a hitherto tacit political promise that has
attended the rise of “smart” technologies. Though IBM had
capitalized for decades on terms associated with intelligence
and thought—its earlier trademarked corporate slogan was
“Think”—smart was by 2008 an adjective attached to many
kinds of computer-mediated technologies and places, includ-
ing phones, houses, cars, classrooms, bombs, chips, and cities.
Palmisano’s “smarter planet” tagline drew on aspects of these
earlier invocations of smartness, and especially the notion that
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smartness required an extended infrastructure that produced
an environment able to automate many human processes and
respond in real time to human choices. His speech also under-
scored that smartness demanded an ongoing penetration of com-
puting into infrastructure to mediate daily perceptions of life.
(Smart phones, for example, are part of a discourse in which
the world is imagined as networked, interactive, and constantly
accessible through technological interfaces, their touch screens
enabled by an infrastructure of satellite networks, server farms,
and cellular towers, among many other structures that facilitate
the regular accessing of services, goods, and spatial location
data.) But as Palmisano’s speech made clear, these infrastruc-
tures now demanded an “infrastructural imaginary”—an ori-
enting telos about what smartness is and does. This imaginary
redefined no less than the relationships among technology,
human sense perception, and cognition. With this extension of
smartness to both the planet and the mind, what had been a
corporate tagline became a governing project able to individu-
ate a citizen and produce a global polity.
This new vision of smartness is inextricably tied to the lan-
guage of crisis, whether a financial, ecological, or security event.
But where others might see the growing precariousness of
human populations as best countered by conscious planning
and regulation, advocates of smartness instead see opportuni-
ties to decentralize agency and intelligence by distributing it
among objects, networks, and life forms. They predict that
environmentally extended smartness will take the place of delib-
erative planning, allowing resilience in a perpetually transform-
ing world. Palmisano proposed “infus[ing] intelligence into
decision making” itself.2 What Palmisano presented in 2008 as
the mandate of a single corporation is central to much contem-
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porary design and engineering thinking more generally.
We call these promises about computation, complexity, inte-
gration, ecology, and crisis “the smartness mandate.” We use
this phrase to mark the fact that the assumptions and goals of
“smart” technologies are widely accepted in global polity dis-
cussions and that they have encouraged the creation of novel
infrastructures that organize environmental policy, energy 
policy, supply chains, the distribution of food and medicine,
finance, and security policies. The smartness mandate draws
on multiple and intersecting discourses, including ecology,
evolutionary biology, computer science, and economics. Binding
and bridging these discourses are technologies, instruments,
apparatuses, processes, and architectures. These experimental
networks of responsive machines, computer mainframes, polit-
ical bodies, sensing devices, and spatial zones lend durable
and material form to smartness, often allowing for its expan-
sion and innovation with relative autonomy from its designers
and champions.
This essay illuminates some of the key ways in which the
history and logic of the smartness mandate are dynamically
embedded in the objects and operations of everyday life—
particularly the everyday lives of those living in the wealthier
Global North, but ideally, for the advocates of smartness, the
lives of every inhabitant of the globe. This approach allows us
to consider questions such as, What kinds of assumptions link
the “predictive” product suggestions made to a global public by
retailers such as Amazon or Netflix with the efforts of Korean
urban planning firms and Indian economic policymakers to
monitor and in real time adapt to the activities of their urban
citizenry? What kinds of ambitions permit the migration of 
statistically based modeling techniques from relatively banal
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consumer applications to regional and transnational strategies
of governance? How do smart technologies that enable socially
networked applications for smartphones—for example, the
Evernote app for distributed multisite and multiuser note taking
used by 200 million registered users located primarily in the
United States, Europe, Latin America, and Asia—also cultivate
new forms of global labor and governmentality, the unity of
which resides in coordination via smart platforms rather than,
for example, geography or class? Each of these examples relies
upon the intermediation of networks and technologies that are
designated as “smart,” yet the impetus for innovation and the
agents of this smartness often remain obscure.
We see the brief history of smartness as a decisive moment
in histories of reason and rationality. In their helpful account
of “Cold War rationality,” Paul Erickson and his colleagues
argue that in the years following World War II American 
science, politics, and industry witnessed “the expansion of the
domain of rationality at the expense of . . . reason,” as machinic
systems and algorithmic procedures displaced judgment and
discretion as ideals of governing rationally.3 Yet at the dawn of
the twenty-first century, Cold War rationality has given way to
the tyranny of smartness, an eternally emergent program of
real-time, short-term calculation that substitutes “demos” (i.e.,
provisional models) and simulations for those systems of arti-
ficial intelligence and professional expertise and calculation
imagined by Cold War rationalists. In place of Cold War war-
ring systems based on “rational” processes that could still fall
under the control and surveillance of centralized authorities or
states, the smartness mandate embraces the ideal of an infinite
range of experimental existences, all based on real-time adap-
tive exchanges among users, environments, and machines.
Neither reason nor rationality are understood as necessary
guides for these exchanges, for smartness is presented as a self-
regulating process of “optimization” and “resilience” (terms
that, as we note below, are themselves moving targets in a
recursive system).
Where Cold War rationality was highly suspicious of inno-
vation, this latter is part of the essence of smartness. In place of
the self-stabilizing systems and homeostasis that were the 
orienting ideal of Cold War theorists, smartness assumes per-
petual growth and unlimited turmoil. Destruction, crisis, and
the absence of architectonic order or rationality are the condi-
tions of possibility for smart growth and optimization. Equally
important: whereas Cold War rationality emanated primarily
from the conceptual publications of a handful of well-funded
think tanks, which tended to understand national populations
and everyday culture as masses that need to be guided, smart-
ness pervades cell phones, delivery trucks, and healthcare 
systems and relies intrinsically on the interactions among, and
the individual idiosyncrasies of, millions or even billions of
individuals around the planet. Moreover, whereas Cold War
rationality was dominated by the thought of the doppelgänger
110 Grey Room 68
rival (e.g., the United States vs. the Soviet Union; the East vs. the
West), smartness is not limited to binaries.4 Rather, it understands
threats as emerging from an environment, which, because it is
always more complex than the systems it encompasses, can
never be captured in the simple schemas of rivalry or game 
theory. This, in turn, allows smartness to take on an ecological
dimension: the key crisis is no longer simply that emerging
from rival political powers or nuclear disaster but is any
unforeseeable event that might emerge from an always too-
complex environment.
If smartness is what follows Cold War understandings of 
reason and rationality, the smartness mandate is the political
imperative that smartness be extended to all areas of life. In this
sense, the smart mandate is what follows “the shock doctrine,”
powerfully described by Naomi Klein and others.5 As Klein
notes in her book of the same name, the shock doctrine was a
set of neoliberal assumptions and techniques that taught poli-
cymakers in the 1970s to take advantage of crises to downsize
government and deregulate in order to extend the “rationality”
of the free market to as many areas of life as possible. The smart
mandate, we suggest, is the current instantiation of a new tech-
nical logic with equally transformative effects on conceptions
and practices of governance, markets, democracy, and even life
itself. Yet where the shock doctrine imagined a cadre of experts
and advisors deployed to various national polities to liberate
markets and free up resources at moments of crisis, the smart-
ness mandate both understands crisis as a normal human con-
dition and extends itself by means of a field of plural
agents—environments, machines, populations, data sets—that
interact in a complex manner and without recourse to what
was earlier understood as reason or intelligence. If the shock
doctrine promoted the idea that systems had to be “fixed” so
that natural economic relationships could express themselves,
the smartness mandate deploys ideas of resilience and prac-
tices management without ideals of futurity or clear measures
of “success” or “failure.” We describe this imperative to
develop and instantiate smartness everywhere as a mandate
in order to capture both its political implications—although
smartness is presented by its advocates as politically agnostic,
it is more accurately viewed as completely reconfiguring the
realm of the political—and the premise that smartness is 
possible only by drawing upon the “collective intelligence” of
large populations.
We seek to sketch the deep logic of smartness and its man-
date in four sections, each focused on a different aspect. These
sections take up the following questions: (1) Where does smart-
ness happen; that is, what kind of space does smartness
require? (2) What is the agent of smartness; that is, what, pre-
cisely, enacts or possesses smartness? (3) What is the key oper-
ation of smartness; that is, what does smartness do? (4) What is
the purported result of smartness; that is, at what does it aim?
Our answers to these four questions are the following:
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1. The territory of smartness is the zone.
2. The (quasi-)agent of smartness is populations.
3. The key operation of smartness is optimization.
4. Smartness produces resilience.
Focusing on how the logics and practices of zones, popula-
tions, optimization, and resilience are coupled enables us to
illuminate not just particular instantiations of smartness—for
example, smart cities, grids, or phones—but smartness more
generally, as well as its mandate (“every process must become
smart!”).
Our analysis draws inspiration from Michel Foucault’s con-
cepts of governmentality and biopolitics, Gilles Deleuze’s brief
account of “the control society,” and critical work on immater-
ial labor. We describe smartness genealogically; that is, as a
concept and set of practices that emerged from the coupling of
logics and techniques from multiple fields (ecology, computer
science, policy, etc.). We also link smartness to the central
object of biopolitics—populations—and see smartness as
bound up with the key goal of biopolitics: governmentality.
And we emphasize the importance of a mode of control based
on what Deleuze describes as open-ended modulation rather
than the permanent molding of discipline. We also underscore
the centrality of data drawn from the everyday activities of
large numbers of people. Yet insofar as smartness positions the
global environment as the fundamental orienting point for all
governance—that is, as the realm of governance that demands
all other problems be seen from the perspective of zones, pop-
ulations, resilience, and optimization—the tools offered by
existing concepts of biopolitics, the control society, and imma-
terial labor take us only part of the way in our account.6
Zones
Smartness has to happen somewhere. However, advocates of
smartness generally imply or explicitly note that its space is not
that of the national territory. Palmisano’s invocation of a smarter
planet, for example, emphasizes the extraterritorial space that
smartness requires: precisely because smartness aims in part at
ecological salvation, its operations cannot be restricted to the
limited laws, territory, or populations of a given national polity.
So, too, designers of “smart homes” imagine a domestic space
freed by intelligent networks from the physical constraints of
the home, while the fitness app on a smart phone conditions
the training of a single user’s body through iterative calcula-
tions correlated with thousands or millions of other users spread
across multiple continents.7 These activities all occur in space,
but the nation-state is neither their obvious nor necessary 
container, nor is the human body and its related psychological
subject their primary focus, target, or even paradigm (e.g.,
smartness often employs entities such as “swarms” that are
never intended to cohere in the manner of a rational or liberal
subject). At the same time, though, smartness also depends on
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complicated and often delicate infrastructures—fiber-optic
cable networks and communications systems capable of access-
ing satellite data; server farms that must be maintained at pre-
cise temperatures; safe shipping routes—that are invariably
located at least in part within national territories and are often
subsidized by federal governments. Smartness thus also
requires the support of legal systems and policing that protect
and maintain these infrastructures, and most of these latter are
provided by national states (even if only in the form of subcon-
tracted private security services).8
This paradoxical relationship of smartness to national terri-
tories is best captured as a mutation of the contemporary form
of space known as “zones.” Related to histories of urban plan-
ning and development, where zoning has long been an instru-
ment in organizing space, contemporary zones have new
properties married to the financial and logistical practices that
underpin their global proliferation. In the past two decades,
numerous urban historians and media theorists have redefined
the zone in terms of its connection to computation, and
described the zone as the dominant territorial configuration of
the present. As architectural theorist Keller Easterling notes,
the zone should be understood as a method of “extra-statecraft”
intended to serve as a platform for the operation of a new “soft-
ware” for governing human activity. Brett Nielsen and Ned
Rossiter invoke the figure of the “logistical city” or zone to
make the same point about governmentality and computation.9
Zones denote not the demise of the state but the production
of new forms of territory, the ideal of which is a space of excep-
tion to national and often international law. A key example is
the so-called free trade zone. Free trade zones are a growing
phenomenon, stretching from Pudong District in Shanghai to
the Cayman Islands, and even the business districts and port
facilities of New York State, and are promoted as conduits for
the smooth transfer of capital, labor, and technology globally
(with smooth defined as a minimum of delay as national borders
are crossed). Free trade zones are in one sense discrete physical
spaces, but they also require new networked infrastructures
linked through the algorithms that underwrite geographic infor-
mation systems (GIS) and global positioning systems (GPS) and
computerized supply chain management systems, as well as the
standardization of container and shipping architecture and reg-
ulatory legal exceptions (to mention just some of the protocols
that produce these spaces). Equally important, zones are under-
stood as outside the legal structure of a national territory, even if
they technically lie within its space.10
In using the term zone to describe the space of smartness,
our point is not that smartness happens in places such as free
trade zones but that smartness aims to globalize the zonal logic,
or mode, of space. This logic of geographic abstraction, detach-
ment, and exemption is exemplified even in a mundane con-
sumer item such as activity monitors—for example, the Fitbit—
that links data about the physical activities of a user in one
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jurisdiction with the data of users in other jurisdictions. This
logic of abstraction is more fully exemplified by the emergence
of so-called smart cities. An organizing principle of the smart
city is that civic governance and public taxation will be driven,
and perhaps replaced, by automated and ubiquitous data col-
lection. This ideal of a “sensorial” city that serves as a conduit
for data gathering and circulation is a primary fantasy enabling
smart cities, grids, and networks. Consider, for example, a pro-
totype “greenfield” (i.e., from scratch) smart city development,
such as Songdo in South Korea. This smart city is designed with
a massive sensor infrastructure for collecting traffic, environ-
mental, and closed-circuit television (CCTV) data and includes
individual smart homes (apartments) with multiple monitors
and touch screens for temperature control, entertainment, light-
ing, and cooking functions. The city’s developers also hope these
living spaces will eventually monitor multiple health conditions
through home testing. Implementing this business plan, how-
ever, will require either significant changes to, or exemptions
from, South Korean laws about transferring health information
outside of hospitals. Lobbying efforts for this juridical change
have been promoted by Cisco Systems (a U.S.-based network
infrastructure provider), the Incheon Free Economic Zone (the
governing local authority), and Posco (a Korean chaebol involved
in construction and steel refining), the three most dominant
forces behind Songdo.
What makes smart territories unique in a world of zonal 
territories is the specific mode by which smartness colonizes
space through the management of time (and this mode also helps
explain why smartness is so successful in promulgating itself
globally). As demonstrated by former IBM chair Palmisano’s
address to the Council on Foreign Relations, smartness is pred-
icated on an imaginary of “crisis” that is to be managed through
a massive increase in sensing devices, which in turn purport-
edly enable self-organization and constant self-modulating and
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self-updating systems. Smart platforms link zones to crisis via
two key operations: (1) a temporal operation, by means of which
uncertainty about the future is managed through constant
redescription of the present as a “version,” “demo,” or “proto-
type” of the future; and (2) an operation of self-organization
through which earlier discourses about structures and the
social are replaced by concerns about infrastructure, a focus on
sensor systems, and a fetish for big data and analytics, which
purportedly can direct “development” in the absence of clear-
cut ends or goals.
In this sense, the development of smart cities such as Songdo
follows a logic of software development. Every present state of
the smart city is understood as a demo or prototype of a future
smart city. Every operation in the smart city is understood in
terms of testing and updating. Engineers interviewed at the site
openly spoke of it as an “experiment” and “test,” admitting that
the system did not work but stressing that problems could be
fixed in the next instantiation elsewhere in the world.11 As a
consequence, there is never a finished product but rather infi-
nitely replicable yet always preliminary, never-to-be-completed
versions of these cities around the globe.
This temporal operation is then linked to an ideal of self-
organization. Smartness largely refers to computationally and
digitally managed systems, from electrical grids to building
management systems, that can learn and, in theory, adapt by
analyzing data about themselves. Self-organization is thus
linked to the operation of optimization. Systems correct them-
selves automatically by adjusting their own operations. This
organization is imagined as being immanent to the physical
and informational system at hand; that is, as optimized by com-
putationally collected data rather than by “external” political
or social actors. At the heart of the smartness mandate is thus a
logic of immanence, by means of which sensor instrumentation
adjoined to emerging and often automated methods for the
analysis of large data sets allow a dynamic system to detect and
direct its continued growth.12
One of the key, troubling consequences of demoing and self-
organization as the two zonal operations of smartness is that
the overarching concept of “crisis” begins to obscure differ-
ences among kinds of catastrophes. While every crisis event—
for example, the 2008 subprime mortgage collapse or the Tohoku
earthquake of 2011—is different, within the demo-logic that
underwrites the production of smart and resilient cities these
differences can be subsumed under the general concept of crisis
and addressed through the same methods (the implications of
which must never be fully engaged because we are always
“demoing” or “testing” solutions, never actually solving the prob-
lem). Whether threatened by terrorism, subprime mortgages,
energy shortages, or hurricanes, smartness always responds in
essentially the same way. The demo is a form of temporal man-
agement that through its practices and discourses evacuates the
historical and contextual specificity of individual catastrophes
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and evades ever having to assess or represent the impact of
these infrastructures, because no project is ever “finished.” This
evacuation of differences, temporalities, and societal structures
is what most concerns us in confronting the extraordinary rise
of ubiquitous computing and high-tech infrastructures as solu-
tions to political, social, environmental, and historical problems
confronting urban design and planning, and engines for pro-
ducing new forms of territory and governance.
Populations
If zones are the places in which smartness takes place, popula-
tions are the agents—or, more accurately, the enabling medium—
of smartness. Smartness is located neither in the source (pro-
ducer) nor the destination (consumer) of a good such as a smart
phone but is the outcome of the algorithmic manipulation of
billions of traces left by thousands, millions, or even billions of
individual users. Smartness requires these large populations,
for they are the medium of the “partial perceptions” within which
smartness emerges. Though these populations should be under-
stood as fundamentally biopolitical in nature, it is more helpful
first to recognize the extent to which smartness relies on an
understanding of population drawn from twentieth-century bio-
logical sciences such as evolutionary biology and ecology.
Biologists and ecologists often use the term population to
describe large collections of individuals with the following
characteristics: (1) the individuals differ at least slightly from
one another; (2) these differences allow some individuals to be
more “successful” vis-à-vis their environment than other indi-
viduals; (3) a form of memory enables differences that are 
successful to appear again in subsequent generations; and, as a
consequence, (4) the distribution of differences across the pop-
ulation tends to change over time.13 This emphasis on the
importance of individual difference for long-term fitness thus
distinguishes this use of the term population from more com-
mon political uses of the term to describe the individuals who
live within a political territory.14
Smartness takes up a biologically oriented concept of popu-
lation but repurposes it for nonbiological contexts. Smartness
presumes that each individual is distinct not only biologically
but in terms of, for example, habits, knowledge, consumer pref-
erences, and that information about these individual differences
can usefully be grouped together so that algorithms can locate
subgroupings of this data that thrive or falter in the face of spe-
cific changes. Though the populations of data drawn from indi-
viduals may map onto traditional biological or political
divisions, groupings and subgroupings more generally revolve
around consumer preferences and are drawn from individuals
in widely separated geographical regions and polities. (For exam-
ple, Netflix’s populations of movie preferences are currently
created from users distributed throughout 190 countries.)15
Moreover, though these data populations are (generally) drawn
from human beings, they are best understood as distinct from
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the human populations from which they emerge: these are sim-
ply data populations of, for example, preferences, reactions, or
abilities. This is true even in the case of information drawn
from human bodies located in the same physical space. In the
case of the smart city, the information streaming from fitness
trackers, smart phones, credit cards, and transport cards are
generated by human bodies in close physical proximity to one
another, but individual data populations are then agglomerated
at different temporalities and scales, depending on the problem
being considered (transportation routing, energy use, consumer
preferences, etc.). These discrete data populations enable
processes to be optimized (i.e., enable “fitness” to be deter-
mined), which in turn produces new populations of data and
hence a new series of potentialities for what a population is and
what potentials these populations can generate.
A key premise of smartness is that while each member of a
population is unique it is also “dumb”—that is, limited in its
“perception”—and that smartness emerges as a property of the
population only when these limited perspectives are linked via
environment-like infrastructures. Returning to the example of
the smart phone operating in a smart city, the phone becomes
a mechanism for creating data populations that operate with-
out the cognition or even direct command of the subject. (The
smart phone, for example, automatically transmits its location
and can also transmit other data about how it has been used.)
If, in the biological domain, populations enable long-term species
survival, then in the cultural domain populations enable smart-
ness, provided the populations are networked together with
smart infrastructures. Populations are the perceptual substrate
that enables modulating interactions among agents within a
system that sustains particular activities. The infrastructures
ensure, for example, that “given enough eyeballs, all bugs are
shallow” (Linus’s Law); that problems can be “crowdsourced”;
and that such a thing as “collective intelligence” exists.16 The
concept of population also allows us to understand better why
the zone is the necessary kind of space enabling smartness, for
there is often no reason that national borders would parse pop-
ulation differences (in abilities, interests, preferences, or biol-
ogy) in any way that is meaningful for smartness.
This creation and analysis of data populations is biopolitical
in the sense initially outlined by Foucault, but smartness is also
a significant mutation in the operation of biopolitics. Foucault
stresses that the concept of population was central to the emer-
gence of biopolitics in the late-eighteenth century, for it denoted
a “collective body” that had its own internal dynamics (of births,
deaths, illness, etc.) that were quasi-autonomous in the sense
that they could not be commanded or completely prevented by
legal structures but could nevertheless be subtly altered
through biopolitical regulatory techniques and technologies
(e.g., required inoculations; free market mechanisms).17 On the
one hand, smartness is biopolitical in this same sense, for 
the members of its populations—populations of movie watchers,
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cell phone users, healthcare purchasers and users, and so on—
are assumed to have their own internal dynamics and regulari-
ties, and the goal of gathering information about these dynamics
is not to discipline individuals into specific behaviors but to find
points of leverage within these regularities that can produce more
subtle and widespread changes.
On the other hand, the biopolitical dimension of smartness
cannot be understood as simply “more of the same,” for four
reasons. First, and in keeping with Deleuze’s reflections on the
control society, the institutions that gather data about popula-
tions are now more likely to be corporations than states.18
Second (and as a consequence of the first point), smartness’s
data populations often concern not those clearly biological
events on which Foucault focused but variables such as atten-
tion, consumer choices, and transportation preferences. Third,
though the data populations that are the medium of smartness
are often drawn from populations of human beings, these data
relate differently to individuals than in the case of Foucault’s
more health-oriented examples. Data populations themselves
often do not need to be (and cannot be) mapped directly back
onto discrete human populations: one is often less interested
in discrete events that happen infrequently along the individ-
ual biographies of a polity (e.g., smallpox infections) than in
frequent events that may happen across widely dispersed groups
of people (e.g., movie preferences). The analysis of these data
populations is then used to create, via smart technologies, an
individual and customized “information-environment” around
each individual. The aim is not to discipline individuals, in
Foucault’s sense, but to extend ever deeper and further the
quasi-autonomous dynamics of populations. Fourth, in the case
of systems such as high-speed financial trading and deriva-
tives, as well as in the logistical management of automated sup-
ply chains, entire data populations are produced and acted
upon directly through entirely machine-to-machine data 
gathering, communication, analytics, and action.19 These new
forms of automation and of producing populations mark trans-
formations in both the scale and intensity of the interweaving
of algorithmic calculation and life.
Optimization
Smartness emerges when zones link the increasingly fine-grained,
quasi-autonomous dynamics of populations for the sake of
optimization. This pursuit of “the best”—the fastest route
between two points; the most reliable prediction of a product a
consumer will like; the least expenditure of energy in a home;
the lowest risk and highest return in a financial portfolio—is
what justifies the term smartness. Contemporary optimization
is a fundamentally quantitative but calculation-intensive oper-
ation; it is a matter of finding, given specified constraints, 
maxima or minima. Locating these limits in population data
often requires millions or billions of algorithmic mathematical
calculations—hence the role of computers (which run complex
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algorithms at speeds that are effectively “real-time” for human
beings), globally distributed sensors (which enable constant
global updating of distributed information), and global com-
munications networks (which connect those sensors with that
computing power).
Though optimization has a history, including techniques of
industrial production and sciences of efficiency and fatigue
pioneered in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
by Fredrick Winslow Taylor and Frank Gilbreth, its current
instantiations radically differ from earlier ones.20 The term
optimization appears to have entered common usage in English
only following World War II.21 Related to emerging techniques
such as game-theoretical tools and computers, optimization is a
particular form of efficiency measure. To optimize is to find the
best relationship between minima and maxima performances
of a system. Optimization is not a normative or absolute mea-
sure of performance but an internally referential and relative
one; it thus mirrors the temporality of the test bed, the version,
and the prototype endemic to “smart” cities and zones.
Optimization is the technique by which smartness promul-
gates the belief that everything—every kind of relationship among
human beings, their technologies, and the environments in
which they live—can and should be algorithmically managed.
Shopping, dating, exercising, the practice of science, the dis-
tribution of resources for public schools, the ht against terrorism,
the calculation of carbon offsets and credits: these processes
can—and must!—be optimized. Optimization fever propels the
demand for ever-more sensors—more sites of data collection,
whether via mobile device apps, hospital clinic databases, or
tracking of website clicks—so that optimization’s realm can
perpetually be expanded and optimization itself further opti-
mized. Smart optimization also demands the ever-increasing
evacuation of private interiority on the part of individuals, for
such privacy is now often implicitly understood as an indefen-
sible withholding of information that could be used for opti-
mizing human relations.22
Smart optimization also presumes a new, fundamentally
practical epistemology, for smartness is not focused on deter-
mining absolutely correct (i.e., “true”) solutions to optimization
problems. The development of calculus in the seventeenth cen-
tury encouraged the hope that, if one could simply find an equa-
tion for a curve that described a system, it would then always be
possible in principle to locate absolute, rather than simply local,
maxima and minima for that system. However, the problems
engaged by smartness—for example, travel mapping, healthcare
outcomes, risk portfolios—often have so many variables and
dimensions that completely solving them, even in principle, is
impossible. As Dan Simon notes, even a problem as apparently
simple as determining the most optimal route for a salesperson
who needs to visit fifty cities would be impossible if one were to
try to calculate all possible solutions. There are 49! (= 6.1 x 1062)
possible solutions to this problem, which is
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beyond the capability of contemporary computing: even
if one had a trillion computers, each capable of calculat-
ing a trillion solutions per second, and these computers
had been calculating since the universe began—a total
computation time of 15 billion years—they would not yet
have come close to calculating all possible routes.23
In the face of the impossibility of determining absolute maxima
or minima for these systems by so-called brute force (i.e., cal-
culating and comparing all possible solutions), contemporary
optimization instead involves finding good-enough solutions:
maxima and minima that may or may not be absolute but are
more likely than other solutions to be close to absolute maxima
or minima. The optimizing engineer selects among different
algorithmic methods that each produce, in different ways and
with different results, good-enough solutions.
In the absence of any way to calculate absolute maxima and
minima, the belief that smartness nevertheless locates “best”
solutions is supported both technically and analogically. This
belief is supported technically in that different optimization
algorithms are run on “benchmark” problems—that is, problems
that contain numerous local maxima and minima but for which
the absolute maximum or minimum is known—to determine how
well the algorithms perform on those types of problems.24 If an
algorithm runs well on a benchmark problem, then it is presumed
to be more likely to run well on similar real-world problems.
The belief that smartness finds the best solutions is also
often supported by the claim that many contemporary opti-
mization algorithms mimic natural processes, especially com-
putational ideals of biological evolution.25 The algorithm begins
with the premise that natural biological evolution automati-
cally solves optimization problems by means of natural popu-
lations. The algorithm then seeks to simulate that process by
creating populations of candidate solutions, which are mixed
with one another (elements of one candidate solution are com-
bined with elements of other candidate solutions) and culled
through successive generations to produce increasingly good
solutions. David B. Fogel, a consultant for the informatics firm
Natural Selection, Inc., which applies computational models to
the streamlining of commercial activities, captures this sense of
optimization as simply a continuation of nature’s work: “Natural
evolution is a population-based optimization process. Simulating
this process on a computer results in stochastic optimization
techniques that can often outperform classical methods of opti-
mization when applied to difficult real-world problems.”26
Optimization research implements these features (reproduc-
tion, mutation, competition, and selection) in computers to
find “natural” laws that can govern the organization of indus-
trial or other processes that, when implemented on a broad scale,
become the conditions of life itself.
This vision of optimization then justifies the extension and
intensification of the zonal logic of smartness. To optimize all
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aspects of existence, smartness must be able to locate its rele-
vant populations (of preferences, events, etc.) wherever they
occur. However, this is possible only when every potential data
point (i.e., partial perception) on the globe can be directly
linked to every other potential data point without interference
from specific geographic jurisdictional regimes. This does not
mean the withering of geographically based security appara-
tuses; on the contrary, optimization often requires strengthen-
ing these to protect the concrete infrastructures that enable
smart networks and to implement optimization protocols. Yet,
like the weather or global warming, optimization is not to be
restricted to, or fundamentally parsed by, the territories that
fund and provide these security apparatuses but must be
allowed to operate as a sort of external environmental force.
Resilience
If smartness happens through zones, if its operations require
populations, and if it aims most fundamentally at optimization,
what is the telos of smartness itself? That is, at what does
smartness aim, and why is smartness understood as a virtue?
The answer is that smartness enables resilience. This is its goal
and raison d’être. The logic of resilience is peculiar in that it aims
not precisely at a future that is “better” in any absolute sense but
at a smart infrastructure that can absorb constant shocks while
maintaining functionality and organization. Following the work
of Bruce Braun and Stephanie Wakefield, we describe resilience
as a state of permanent management that does without guiding
ideals of progress, change, or improvement.27
The term resilience plays important, though differing, roles
in multiple fields. These include engineering and material sci-
ences—since the nineteenth century, the “modulus of resilience”
has measured the capacity of materials such as woods and 
metals to return to their original shape after impact—as well as
ecology, psychology, sociology, geography, business, and public
policy, in which resilience names ways in which ecosystems,
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individuals, communities, corporations, and states respond 
to stress, adversity, and rapid change.28 However, the under-
standing of resilience most crucial to smartness and the smart-
ness doctrine was first forged in ecology in the 1970s, especially
in the work of C.S. Holling, who established a key distinction
between “stability” and “resilience.” Working from a systems
perspective and interested in the question of how human beings
could best manage elements of ecosystems of commercial 
interest (e.g., salmon, wood), Holling developed the concept of
resilience to contest the premise that ecosystems were most
healthy when they returned quickly to an equilibrium state after
being disturbed (and in this sense his paper critiqued then cur-
rent industry practices).
Holling defines stability as the ability of a system that had
been perturbed to return to a state of equilibrium, but he
argued that stable systems were often unable to compensate for
significant, swift environmental changes. As Holling writes,
the “stability view [of ecosystem management] emphasizes the
equilibrium, the maintenance of a predictable world, and the
harvesting of nature’s excess production with as little fluctua-
tion as possible,” yet this approach that “assures a stable max-
imum sustained yield of a renewable resource might so change
[the conditions of that system] . . . that a chance and rare event
that previously could be absorbed can trigger a sudden dra-
matic change and loss of structural integrity of the system.”29
Resilience, by contrast, denotes for Holling the capacity of a
system to change in periods of intense external perturbation
and thus to persist over longer time periods. The concept of
resilience encourages a management approach to ecosystems
that “would emphasize the need to keep options open, the need
to view events in a regional rather than a local context, and the
need to emphasize heterogeneity.” Resilience is thus linked to
concepts of crisis and states of exception; that is, it is a virtue
when the latter are assumed to be either quasi-constant or the
most relevant states. Holling also underscores that the move-
ment from stability to resilience depends upon an epistemo-
logical shift: “Flowing from this would be not the presumption
of sufficient knowledge, but the recognition of our ignorance:
not the assumption that future events are expected, but that
they will be unexpected.”30
Smartness abstracts the concept of resilience from a systems
approach to ecology and turns it into an all-purpose episte-
mology and value, positing resilience as a more general strategy
for managing perpetual uncertainty and encouraging the premise
that the world is indeed so complex that unexpected events are
the norm. Smartness enables this generalization of resilience in
part because it abstracts the concept of populations from the
specifically biological sense employed by Holling. Smartness
sees populations of preferences, traits, and algorithmic 
solutions, as well as populations of individual organisms.
Resilience also functions in the discourse of smartness to col-
lapse the distinction between emergence (something new) and
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emergency (something new that threatens), and does so to 
produce a world where any change can be technically managed
and assimilated while maintaining the ongoing survival of 
the system rather than of individuals or even particular groups.
The focus of smartness is thus the management of the relation-
ships between different populations of data, some of which 
can be culled and sacrificed for systemic maintenance.31
Planned obsolescence and preemptive destruction combine
here to encourage the introduction of more computation into
the environment—and emphasize as well that resilience of the
human species may necessitate the sacrifice of “suboptimal”
populations.
The discourse of resilience effectively erases the differences
among past, present, and future. Time is not understood through
an historical or progressive schema but through the schemas of
repetition and recursion (the same shocks and the same meth-
ods are repeated again and again), even as these repetitions and
recursions produce constantly differing territories. This is a
self-referential difference, measured or understood only in
relation to the many other versions of smartness (e.g., earlier
smart cities), which all tend to be built by the same corporate
and national assemblages.
The collapse of emergence into emergency also links resilience
to financialization through derivation, as the highly leveraged
complex of Songdo demonstrates.32 The links that resilience
establishes among emergency, financialization, and derivatives
are also exemplified by New York City, which, after the devas-
tation of Hurricane Sandy in 2012, adopted the slogan “Fix and
Fortify.” This slogan underscores an acceptance of future shock
as a necessary reality of urban existence, while at the same time
leaving the precise nature of these shocks unspecified (though
they are often implied to include terrorism as well as environ-
mental devastation). The naturalization of this state is vividly
demonstrated by the irony that the real destruction of New
York had earlier been imagined as an opportunity for innova-
tion, design thinking, and real estate speculation. In 2010,
shortly before a real hurricane hit New York, the Museum of
Modern Art (MoMA) and P.S.1 Contemporary Art Center ran a
design competition and exhibition titled Rising Currents,
which challenged the city’s premier architecture and urban
design firms to design for a city ravaged by the elevated sea 
levels produced by global warming:
MoMA and P.S.1 Contemporary Art Center joined forces
to address one of the most urgent challenges facing the
nation’s largest city: sea-level rise resulting from global
climate change. Though the national debate on infrastruc-
ture is currently focused on “shovel-ready” projects that
will stimulate the economy, we now have an important
opportunity to foster new research and fresh thinking
about the use of New York City’s harbor and coastline. As
in past economic recessions, construction has slowed
Halpern, Mitchell, Geoghegan | The Smartness Mandate: Notes toward a Critique 123
dramatically in New York, and much of the city’s remark-
able pool of architectural talent is available to focus on
innovation.33
A clearer statement of the relationship of urban planners to crisis
is difficult to imagine: Planning must simply assume and assim-
ilate future, unknowable shocks, and these shocks may come in
any form. This stunning statement turns economic tragedy, the
unemployment of most architects, and the imagined coming
environmental apocalypse into an opportunity for specula-
tion—technically, aesthetically, and economically. This is a
quite literal transformation of emergency into emergence and
for creating a model for managing perceived and real risks to
the population and infrastructure of the territory not by “solving”
the problem but by absorbing shocks and modulating the way
environment is managed. New York in the present becomes a
mere demo for the post-catastrophe New York, and the differ-
ential between these two New Yorks is the site of financial,
engineering, and architectural interest and speculation.
This relationship of resilience to the logic of demos and
derivatives is illuminated by the distinction between risk and
uncertainty first laid out in the 1920s by the economist Frank
Knight. According to Knight, uncertainty, unlike risk, has 
no clearly defined endpoints or values.34 Uncertainty offers no
clear-cut terminal events. If the Cold War was about nuclear
testing and simulation as a way to avoid an unthinkable but
nonetheless predictable event—nuclear war—the formula has
now been changed. We live in a world of fundamental uncer-
tainty, which can only ever be partially and provisionally cap-
tured through discrete risks. When uncertainty, rather than
risk, is understood as the fundamental context, “tests” can no
longer be understood primarily as a simulation of life; rather,
the test bed makes human life itself an experiment for techno-
logical futures. Uncertainty thus embeds itself in our tech-
nologies, both those of architecture and of finance. In financial
markets, for example, risks that are never fully accounted for are
continually “swapped,” “derived,” and “leveraged” in the hope
that circulation will defer any need to represent risk, and in
infrastructure, engineering, and computing we do the same.35
As future risk is transformed into uncertainty, smart and
ubiquitous computing infrastructures become the language and
practice by which to imagine and create our future. Instead of
looking for utopian answers to our questions regarding the
future, we focus on quantitative and algorithmic methods and
on logistics—on how to move things rather than on questions
of where they should end up. Resilience as the goal of smart
infrastructures of ubiquitous computing and logistics becomes
the dominant method for engaging with possible urban collapse
and crisis (as well as the collapse of other kinds of infrastruc-
ture, such as those of transport, energy, and finance). Smartness
thus becomes the organizing concept for an emerging form of
technical rationality whose major goal is management of an
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uncertain future through a constant deferral of future results;
for perpetual and unending evaluation through a continuous
mode of self-referential data collection; and for the construc-
tion of forms of financial instrumentation and accounting that
no longer engage (or even need to engage with), alienate, or
translate what capital extracts from history, geology, or life.
Smartness and Critique
Smartness is both a reality and an imaginary, and this comin-
gling underwrites both its logic and the magic of its popularity.
As a consequence, though, the critique of smartness cannot
simply be a matter of revealing the inequities produced by its
current instantiations. Critique is itself already central to smart-
ness, in the sense that perpetual optimization requires perpet-
ual dissatisfaction with the present and the premise that things
can always be better. The advocates of smartness can always
plausibly claim (and likely also believe) that the next demo will
be more inclusive, equitable, and just. The critique of smart-
ness thus needs to confront directly the terrible but necessary
complexity of thinking and acting within earthly scale—and
even extraplanetary-scale—technical systems.
This means in part stressing, as we have done here, that the
smartness mandate transforms conditions of environmental
degradation, inequality, and injustice, mass extinctions, wars,
and other forms of violence by means of the demand to under-
stand the present as a demo oriented toward the future, and by
necessitating a single form of response—increased penetration
of computation into the environment—for all crises. On the other
hand, not only the agency and transformative capacities of the
smart technical systems but the deep appeal of this approach
to managing an extraordinarily complex and ecologically frag-
ile world are impossible to deny. None of us are eager to aban-
don our cell phones or computers. Moreover, the epistemology
of partial truths, incomplete perspectives, and uncertainty with
which Holling sought to critique capitalist understandings of
environments and ecologies still holds a weak messianic poten-
tial for revising older modern forms of knowledge and for build-
ing new forms of affiliation, agency, and politics grounded in
uncertainty, rather than objectivity and surety, and in this way
keeping us open to plural forms of life and thought. However,
insofar as smartness separates critique from conscious, collec-
tive, human reflection—that is, insofar as smartness seeks to
steer communities algorithmically, in registers operating below
consciousness and human discourse—critiquing smartness will
in part be a matter of excavating and rethinking each of its 
central concepts and practices (zones, populations, optimiza-
tion, and resilience), as well as the temporal logic that emerges
from the particular way in which smartness combines these
concepts and practices.
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